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West Valley City,

Brlgham Young University
Law Library
JRCB

Plaintiff and Respondent,
v,

Opinion

Kenneth H. Rislow,

Case No. 860218-CA

Defendant and Appellant.

FILED

Before Judges Davidson, Greenwood and Jackson.

APR 15 1987
DAVIDSON,

Judge:

Timothy M. Shea
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals

Defendant was convicted of the crime of lewdness, a Class
B Misdemeanor, in the Fifth Circuit Court. The conviction was
affirmed in the Third District Court. Defendant now raises a
constitutional issue claiming he was denied effective
assistance of counsel. We affirm.
On May 4, 1985, Rislow entered a ZCMI store in West
Valley City. An employee observed Rislow and noted that his
"private parts were showing for all the world to see" from
beneath the jogging shorts he was wearing. Three other ZCMI
employees saw that defendant's genitalia were exposed and one
of them contacted a West Valley City policeman who confronted
Rislow. The information for lewdness was signed on May 17,
1985, and the jury trial was held on December 19, 1985.
In the rebuttal stage of closing argument, the prosecutor
made the following statement:
Counsel finally says he's [defendant]
guilty of being a slop, not lewdness. I'm
sorry. It's more than that. It's much
more than that. Do you want people
walking into the stores where you shop,
dressed in that fashion, dangling their
genitalia and you're going to find them
not guilty? See, that presumption of
innocence just went out the window. It's
now time for you to decide, to decide this
case. If you want those people walking

around in your stores where you shop, then
you're going to find him not guilty. If
you want to put a stop to it, you're going
. v-%>
to find him guilty. You raised your *hand, *>-><**an obligation, you swore that you would
well and truly try this case. I'm asking
you now to do what you agreed to do.
Defendant contends these remarks are improper and
inflammatory. Rislow's appeal claims that the failure of his
counsel to object when the remarks were made amounts to the
denial of his right to effective assistance of counsel.
We must first determine whether the prosecutor's remarks
were improper. The appropriate, two-part test is stated in
State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (Utah 1973).
[1] did the remarks call to the attention
of the jurors matters which they would not
be justified in considering in determining
their verdict, and [2] were they, under
the circumstances of the particular case,
probably influenced by those remarks.
By the prosecutor's remarks, the jurors were encouraged
to consider whether or not they personally wanted to observe
individuals "dangling their genitalia" while they shopped. If
the jurors would not relish this experience then they were to
find Rislow guilty. This suggestion goes beyond the evidence
and should not be considered by the jury. The remarks must be
labeled as being improper.
The second part of the Valdez test requires us to
determine if the jury was influenced by the remarks. In State
v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 400, 403 (Utah 1986), quoting State v*
Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court
wrote that conflicting or circumstantial evidence in the record
would render jurors more susceptible to influence by improper
argument. But if proof of a defendant's guilt is strong, the
challenged conduct or remarks by the prosecutor will not be
presumed prejudicial. Troy at 486. This is the situation
before us. Defendant cannot claim the evidence properly
introduced at trial was conflicting as it related to his
exposure nor can he claim that it lacked strength. Four
witnesses observed Rislow's exposed genitalia, an experience
not easily mistaken particularly in the environment of a
shopping mall where such an event demands notice and
remembrance. We, therefore, hold the prosecutor's improper
remarks did not influence the jury to the extent that their
verdict would have been other than that rendered.
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The Utah Supreme Court in Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d
1101, 1109 (Utah 1983), established the standard to be applied
when the issue of ineffectiveness of counsel is raised. That
Court wrote:
(1) The burden of establishing inadequate
representation is on the defendant Mand
proof of such must be a demonstrable
reality, and not a speculative matter.w
(2) A lawyer's "legitimate exercise of
judgment" in the choice of trial strategy
or tactics that did not produce the
anticipated result does not constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel.
(3) It must appear that any deficiency in
the performance of counsel was
prejudicial. In this context, prejudice
means that without counsel's error there
was a "reasonable likelihood that there
would have been a different result."
Examination of the trial record reveals defense counsel
did raise objections prior to the remarks of the prosecutor.
Defense counsel may have believed that any objection at this
point in the proceedings would only have emphasized the
negative aspects of the case to the jury. This could have been
a legitimate exercise of judgment.
We have already disposed of the possibility of prejudice
resulting from the prosecutor's remarks. The quality and
quantity of evidence presented by the prosecutor negates any
rational belief that but for defense counsel's failure to
object, defendant would have received a more favorable
verdict. The trial judge gave his opinion of the effectiveness
of both counsel when he thanked them for their courtesy to each
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other and stated that both had done their jobs -extremely well."
The conviction is affirmed.

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

WE CONCUR:

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

Norman H, Jackson, Judge
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